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Prior research suggests that state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
have lower performance levels than non-state-owned 
enterprises (NSOE). The main goal of this study is to analyse 
the impact of State ownership on profitability, using two 
major measures of performance: Return on Equity and Return 
on Assets, and a broader sample of about 11,000 firms, from 
37 countries, between 2003 and 2011. Our main results 
suggest that SOE are less profitable than NSOE for both 
performance measures. This finding remains equal in the crisis 
periods and for Western and Eastern Europe countries. We 
also find a negative relationship between State control and 
SOE´s profitability levels. Additional results indicate that, in 
general, SOE from Western Europe are more profitable than 
SOE from Eastern Europe. 
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State-owned enterprises (SOE) have contributed significantly to the gross domestic product, 
employment, and market capitalisation of many OECD countries, and they continue to play an 
important role in the economies of many countries outside the OECD (OECD, 2005). However, 
not many studies analyse the reality of this universe of enterprises, specifically, how efficiently they 
manage their resources and the performance levels that they obtain. 
Although there is a general perception that non-state-owned enterprises (NSOE) have a better 
operational and financial performance than SOE, there is no consensus in the literature on the 
subject. Some authors, such as Bozec et al. (2002) and Caves & Christensen (1980), state that the 
performance of SOE is equal to, or slightly higher than the performance of privately-owned 
enterprises; while others, such as Boardman & Vinning (1989) and Picot & Kaulmann (1989), argue 
that NSOE have better profitability levels than those owned by the State. There is, however, a 
growing concern from the part of the governments to raise the level of profitability of their 
enterprises (Ramamurti, 1987). 
The main goal of this study is to analyse and compare the profitability of European state-owned 
and non-state-owned enterprises. The impact of the recent international financial crisis1 on the 
profitability of SOE and NSOE, as well as a comparison between the profitability levels of SOE in 
Western and Eastern Europe will also be discussed.  
This study is motivated by several considerations. Although its subject is actual and of public 
interest, the majority of the studies that focus on this issue are relatively outdated and not many 
are centered on the European context, and particularly Western Europe. Moreover, many of the 
existing studies only concentrate on enterprises from a given country, and not many use an 
international sample. The aim is, therefore, to make a contribution to a better understanding of 
the existing differences between the performance levels of SOE and NSOE in Europe.  
This study analyses 10,944 enterprises, of which 3,042 are state-owned, and 7,902 are non-state-
owned, from 24 different industry sectors, and 37 European countries, over a 9-year period (2003-
2011). The descriptive analysis of the sample reveals that, on average, SOE are larger and employ 
more people than their non-state-owned counterparts.  
The main results of this study suggest that SOE are less profitable than NSOE, both in terms of 
Return on Equity (ROE) and Return on Assets (ROA). On average, the ROE of a SOE is about 
3.5% lower, and the ROA is 2.7% lower than those of a NSOE.  
The results also suggest that the greater the State control in SOE, the lower the profitability levels 
achieved.  
                                                 
1 By financial crises, we consider both the 2007-2009 global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. 




The study also shows that Western European SOE are more effective in managing their assets than 
Eastern European SOE, despite the weight that such enterprises continue to have in the economies 
of Eastern Europe. Regarding NSOE, the inverse is found.  
Finally, the study concludes that the profitability difference between SOE and NSOE is also a reality 
during the financial crisis period and that both types of enterprises lost profitability during that 
same period.  
This paper is divided into 5 parts: Chapter 2 presents a brief literature review and formulates a 
research hypothesis; Chapter 3 describes the sample and the methodology used in the study; 
Chapter 4 presents the main results, and; finally, Chapter 5 presents the main conclusions, the main 
limitations, and future research ideas.     
Literature Review 
Profitability of SOE vs. NSOE 
Studies that analyse and compare the performance of SOE and NSOE can be grouped into two 
larger groups: a first group, where this study belongs, which compares the performance of SOE 
and NSOE, namely Boardman & Vining (1989), Reeves & Ryan (1998), Dewenter & Malatesta (2001) 
and Bozec et al. (2002), and a second group; which compares the performance of SOE before and 
after privatisation, namely Ng et al. (2008) and Kang & Byung-Yeon (2012). 
Although the prevailing idea in the literature is that SOE are less profitable than NSOE, some 
authors argue that SOE have equal or slightly higher levels of profitability than NSOE (Bozec et al., 
2002; Cave & Christensen, 1980).  
González-Párano & De Cos (2005) state that it is not easy to find a consensus on this issue in the 
literature, as there is not only a large geographical divergence in the samples, but also a wide 
divergence in terms of the methodologies, variables, and timeframes used in the different studies.  
Boardman & Vining (1989; 1992) analyse the performance of the enterprises listed in the 
“International 500” of Fortune magazine, and come to the conclusion that SOE are less profitable 
than NSOE. The results of these studies also suggest that the profitability of SOE varies according 
to the industry sector, and that in sectors with limited or highly regulated competition, there is 
evidence of a higher efficiency in SOE.  
Dewenter & Malatesta (2001), using the same methodology of Boardman & Vinning (1989), also 
come to the conclusion that the SOE listed in “Fortune 500” have profitability levels well below 
than those of NSOE. They also conclude that SOE employ more workers, have a higher volume of 
sales and assets, and are more leveraged (as they are financed at lower interest rates) than their 
non-state-owned counterparts. Picot & Kaulmann (1989) had already arrived to similar conclusions.  




Reeves & Ryan (1998) conclude that Irish NSOE are more profitable than those that are state-
owned, despite having similar labour productivity levels. Arens & Brouthers (2001) arrive to same 
conclusion with respect to Romanian SOE, arguing that SOE do not adapt as well to changes in the 
market, do not apply aggressive marketing strategies, and, therefore, have lower performance levels 
than their non-state-owned counterparts.  
Bozec et al. (2002) divide Canadian SOE into those that maximize profits, and those that do not 
maximize profits, and conclude that SOE that maximize profits have similar results to NSOE. The 
result of this study emphasizes the importance of taking into account the objectives of SOE in 
similar studies, rather than just making a simple distinction between the kinds of enterprises, as it 
is the case of most studies. This idea had already been put forward by Reeves & Ryan (1998).   
In summary, although there are studies that show opposite results, most studies suggest that SOE 
have worse performance levels and are less profitable than NSOE. However, throughout time, the 
gap between SOE and NSOE in terms of profitability levels (Caves & Christensen, 1980 and Davies, 
1971) or productivity levels (Reeves & Ryan, 1998) has been decreasing. In particular, due to the 
expansion and internationalization of SOE, there has been a growing concern on the part of the 
State to better manage its enterprises and make them more profitable (Ramamurti, 1987), and SOE 
tends to have performance levels closer to those of NSOE (Bozec et al., 2002). 
Explanatory Factors of Productivity Differences  
In an international approach, Mascarenhas (1989) studies and characteries the SOE of 34 different 
countries and comes to the conclusion that SOE are more focused on their internal markets, having 
dominant positions in their home markets. SOE have a stable customer base, sell a small range of 
products, and have technology levels lower than those of NSOE.  
The literature points out two main factors to explain the profitability difference between SOE and 
NSOE: lack of competition in SOE, and the fact that the State is the main, and sometimes the only, 
capital owner (ownership). 
Competition 
According to Borcherding et al., (1982), in a competitive environment, the difference in unit costs 
between State and private producers will be negligible. As many SOE are monopolistic or have 
dominant market positions, some authors claim that it is the lack of competition, together with the 
lack of motivation from the part of management and workers in the public sector that lead to a 
worse performance of SOE.  
Doamekpor (1996) states that the inherent lack of competition of SOE means that they do not 
innovate and do not take risk decisions and, consequently, produce inefficiently or less efficiently 
than if they were operating in highly competitive environments. Shleifer (1998) also stresses the 




important role of competition in business innovation, something SOE lack, as they mostly face little 
competition.  
The lack of monitoring and performance appraisal systems of SOE managers is also referred to in 
the literature as being an explanatory factor for the lower level of performance. The fact that these 
managers do not see their good decisions rewarded may lead to a reduction in levels of managers’ 
motivation and innovation and, consequently, adversely affect the performance of the enterprises 
(Barton, 1979). 
Finally, in order to be efficient, businesses have to operate on the edge of their production 
capacities, a fact that, according to the literature, rarely happens in SOE (Leibenstein 1966; 
González-Párano & De Cos, 2005). 
Ownership 
According to Vining & Boardman (1992), ownership of capital has a very significant impact on the 
lives of enterprises. Many authors, including González-Párano & De Cos (2005), argue that the fact 
that SOE are held by, and are dependent on the State affects their performance and profitability, 
leading them to have lower profitability rates than their non-state-owned counterparts.   
One of the main factors identified in the literature to explain the different levels of performance 
and profitability is the difference in the objectives of SOE and NSOE. According to Bozec et al. 
(2002), the difference in objectives may lead to unexpected findings. In fact, many SOE have as their 
sole objective the promotion and improvement of social welfare (González-Párano & De Cos, 
2005), while NSOE have as their main objective the maximization of profit.  
On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that state-owned enterprises are technically 
controlled by taxpayers and run by managements that usually have political ambitions whose 
objectives may not be aligned with the maximization of the enterprise’s value and the contribution 
to social welfare.  
Doamekpor (1996) e Arocena & Oliveros (2012), among others, argue that the difference in 
performance levels of SOE and NSOE can be explained based on three main theories: agency; 
ownership rights, and; public choice. 
With regard to arguments supported by the agency theory, Picot & Kaulmann (1989) state that the 
fact that there is no real "owner" of SOE affects their performance, and means that shareholders 
exercise no pressure or place demand on public managers. According to these authors, the State 
exercises little control over SOE, and the pressure on the return on equity and on the final product 
is usually weak.  
In turn, González-Párano & De Cos (2005) are of the opinion that SOE meet the demand of the 
voters and the State, while their non-state-owned counterparts only answer to their shareholders, 




who are in a closer relationship with managers and can therefore put greater pressure for better 
results.  
In terms of ownership rights, the State intervenes to save SOE in case of financial difficulties (Picot 
& Kaulmann, 1989), and, therefore, these enterprises do not face the threat of being acquired by a 
third party, or being subject to a hostile takeover (Wintrobe, 1987). Thus, SOE do not suffer as 
much pressure to improve performance levels, as their survival and continuity are somewhat 
secured.  
Finally, it may be more important to achieve personal goals for State enterprise managers and 
politicians, such as power and prestige, than to improve the efficiency of SOE. Political competition, 
caused by elections, can be positive, as it may lead to social gains, but it can also be negative if SOE 
are managed solely with the aim of achieving electoral results (Wintrobe, 1987), and such aim 
affects the performance of the enterprise (Shleifer, 1998). 
In addition, in SOE there is a risk of governments appointing managers based on their political 
affiliation, rather than on their professional competence (Murray, 1975; Picot & Kaulmann, 1989), 
which can lead to the assignment of incompetent managers (Murray, 1975). In turn, in NSOE the 
filling of managerial positions is based on the competence, merit, and résumés of the candidates, 
and not on their party affiliations (Murray, 1975). 
In summary, the dominant market position (in some cases a monopolistic position), the absence of 
monitoring by the State, the lack of incentives, the lack of competence of public administrators, the 
lack of pressure for results, as well as political and electoral issues, are all usually identified as being 
explanatory factors for the difference in the levels of performance and profitability between SOE 
and NSOE.  
Therefore, and based on the results presented in this chapter, we formulate the following 
hypothesis of study: 
H1: SOE are less profitable than NSOE. 
Sample and Methodology 
Sample  
All data were collected from the Amadeus database, the property of Bureau Van Dijk. Information 
was accessed and consulted during June 2013. 
The sample period covers nine years of observations, corresponding to the time period of 2003 to 
2011. The sample consists of non-financial enterprises from all over Europe, with over 250 




employees and a turnover exceeding €1 million2 in 2012. The use of these criteria will allow greater 
comparability between the enterprises in the sample and avoids possible distortions in the results 
caused by the inclusion of small businesses. 
The criterion used to define an enterprise as “state-owned” is what is termed as “ultimate owner” 
in the Amadeus database. This criterion takes into account “who” really has control of the 
enterprise, being that the owner needs to control at least 25.01% of the enterprise. Therefore, the 
sample of SOE consists of businesses whose ultimate owner is the State of a country, or a holding 
owned by a State that control other SOE (e.g. Parpública manages the holdings of the Portuguese 
State in other enterprises). 
On the other hand, NSOE are companies whose ultimate owner is not an entity belonging to the 
State of a given country or the State itself. These enterprises might have as shareholders holding 
companies controlled by a State, however, these enterprises are controlled by private individuals 
and are, therefore, considered to be NSOE (e.g. a small part of Volkswagen is held by a Qatari 
sovereign wealth fund, but the enterprise is controlled by the Porsche-Peich family). It might also 
occur that the ultimate owner is a financial enterprise, but what is important is that the enterprise 
in the sample is not a financial business.  
As there was a large difference between the number of SOE and NSOE in the initial sample, data 
regarding NSOE were redefined in order to minimize that difference. First, in the SOE sample, the 
mean and standard deviation of the values of the items Sales and Assets for each NAICS 2007 
industry sector (first two digits) was calculated. Then, once these values were calculated and the 
outliers3 removed, an interval of the mean plus (minus) the standard deviation of the value of Sales 
and Assets of each industry sector was created. Finally, all NSOE with values of Sales and Assets 
outside that interval were removed from the sample. Thus, not only the initial discrepancy between 
the number of SOE and NSOE was minimized, but also their comparability was increased.  
Appendix 1 presents the composition of the sample by country. The final sample consists of 10,944 
enterprises, 3,042 SOE (about 28% of the total), and 7,902 NSOE from 37 European countries. 
The five most-represented countries in the sample, accounting for about 67% of all enterprises, 
are in descending order: Germany, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, and France. The countries with the 
highest percentage of SOE are naturally the countries of Eastern Europe, such as Russia (70.3%), 
Ukraine (93.3%), and Poland (85.25%). 
Appendix 2 shows the composition of the sample by industry sector. The most significant sector 
is the Manufacturing sector, which represents about 28% of all enterprises in the sample. Regarding 
SOE, the most representative sectors are Waste Management and Remediation Services, Health 
                                                 
2 Based on the definition criteria of SME provided by the Commission Recommendation 96/280/CE of 3 April, 1996. 
3 Values below 1st percentile and above 99th percentile were all considered outliers. 




Care, and Urban Transportation. For NSOE, the most significant are Holdings, Consultancy 
Services for Enterprises and Construction (values not reported). 
Empirical Models 
Based on previous studies, namely those of Boardman & Vinning (1989,1992), Dewenter & 
Malatesta (2001), Arcas & Bachiller (2008), and Mollah et al. (2012), the two most commonly used 
measures of profitability in the literature were used: ROE and ROA4, and the models (1) and (2) 
were estimated by using pooled OLS: 
ROEit = β0 + β1 PUB + β2 Leverageit + β3 Liquidityit + β4 Tangibilityit + β5 Sizeit   
+ β6 LnBoardit + β7 LnNetIncomeit + ∑ β Country + ∑ β Year + ∑ β Sectori + εi                                    (1) 
where ROEi is the return on equity of enterprise i during period t; PUB is a dummy variable that 
has the value 1 for a SOE and 0 for a NSOE; Leverage is the level of indebtedness; Liquidity is the 
availability of liquid assets; Tangibility is the level at which an asset can be used as a collateral; Size 
is the enterprise dimension; LnBoard is the size of the Board, and; LnNetIncome is the net income.  
All control variables were selected and calculated based on previous studies that identified them 
as being determinant of the level of return on equity and assets generated by enterprises (Arcas & 
Bachiller (2008) and Mollah et al. (2012), among others). In order to control the impact of the 
different characteristics of countries, sectors, and years on profitability levels, three additional 
dummy variables were also included: Country; Sector, and; Year. For a more detailed description 
and calculation of variables see Appendix 3. 
If the coefficient of the PUB variable, the independent variable of interest, is negative, this means 
that the return on equity of SOE is lower than their non-state-owned counterparts.  
ROAit = β0 + β1 PUB + β2 Leverageit + β3 Liquidityit + β4 Tangibilityit + β5 Sizeit   
+ β6 LnBoardit + ∑ β Cuntry + ∑ β Year + ∑ β Sectori + εi                                                                                     (2) 
where ROAi is the return on assets of enterprise i during period t. Regarding model (1), the variable 
LnNetIncome was removed, as it is moderately correlated with the dependent variable ROA (0.45), 
which does not happen with ROE (0.26)5.  
Once again, a negative coefficient of the PUB variable means that the ROA of SOE is lower than 
that of NSOE. 
 
                                                 
4 Economic Value Added (EVA™) would probably be a more appropriate measure of performance. However, the lack of 
data to calculate it makes it impossible to use it as a dependent variable.  
5 According to Franzblau (1958), correlations between 0.2 and 0.4 are considered weak. Only from 0.4 are they considered 
moderate.  






Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the dependent variables, as well as of two variables 
that help to better characterize the companies analysed: number of employees, and total assets.  
NSOE have a higher average profitability, have fewer employees, and are smaller. There is a striking 
difference in the profitability level, which is about 13 percentage points in ROE, and 3 percentage 
points in ROA. On average, SOE are larger and employ about 50% more people.  
ROE: Net Income/Equity; ROA: Net Income/Total Assets; Employees: No. of Employees; Size: Total Assets. 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Additionally, t-tests were performed to compare the means of these variables (numbers not 
reported), in order to assess the statistics viability of the differences found between SOE and 
NSOE. The results suggest that all differences are statically significant.  
Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the models (1) and (2). 
The PUB variable has a negative correlation with both profitability variables, suggesting that SOE 
have lower ROE and ROA levels than NSOE. With the exception of the variables Size and 
LnNetIncome (Panel A), all variables show relatively low correlations between each other, allowing 
us to believe that there were no problems of multicollinearity. 
Panel A – Correlations between Model 1 variables 
  SOE NSOE 
  Mean Median SDeviation Mean Median SDeviation 
ROE 3.75 2.06 0.191 16.51 12.27 0.175 
ROA 1.50 0.08 0.051 4.28 3.42 0.035 
Employees 2,049 496 77.98 1 072 532 10.12 
Size (€)  812,386,000   15,139,060   171,990   236,896,000   78,599,850   4,738.31  
 ROE Liquidity Tangibility Leverage PUB Size LnBoard LnNI 
ROE 1.000        
Liquidity -0.000  1.000       
Tangibility -0.172*** -0.002 1.000      
Leverage  0.113*** -0.005 -0.288*** 1.000     
PUB -0.153*** -0.001 0.520*** -0.274*** 1.000    
Size  0.003  0.003   -0.102*** 0.105*** -0.356*** 1.000   
LnBoard  0.034***  0.002 -0.235*** 0.129*** -0.351*** 0.423*** 1.000  
 LnNI   0.264***  0.002 -0.205*** 0.027*** -0.432*** 0.755*** 0.389*** 1.000 





Panel B – Correlations between Model 2 variables 
 ROA Liquidity Tangibility Leverage PUB Size LnBoard 
ROA 1.000       
Liquidity 0.000 1.000      
Tangibility -0.176*** -0.002 1.000     
Leverage -0.213*** -0.005 -0.288*** 1.000    
PUB -0.157*** -0.001 0.520*** -
0.274*** 
1.000   
Size 0.019*** 0.003 -0.102*** 0.105*** -0.356*** 1.000  
LnBoard 0.079*** 0.002 -0.235*** 0.129*** -0.351*** 0.423*** 1.000 
ROE: Net Income/Equity; ROA: Net Income/Total Assets; Liquity: Current Assets /Current Liabilities; 
Tangibility: Fixed Tangible Assets/Total Assets; PUB: dummy variable with value 1 for SOE and 0 for NSOE; 
Leverage: Total Liabilities / Total Assets; Size: Ln (Total Assets); LnBoard: Ln (No. Board Members); 
LnNI: Ln (Net Income). ***, **, *, statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 2- Correlation Matrix 
Profitability of SOE vs. NSOE 
Table 3 shows the results of regressions (1) and (2). The results suggest that SOE are less profitable 
than NSOE in both performance measures, which is consistent with the results obtained in previous 
tests.  
The ROE of SOE is on average 3.5% lower than the ROE of NSOE, and the ROA is on average 
2.6% lower than the ROA of NSOE, all the rest remain the same.  
These results are in line with the idea that prevails in the literature that SOE are less efficient in 
managing their assets and the capital invested by their owners. Stronger pressure for better results 
and higher returns on capital from shareholders of NSOE compared with less pressure and control 
from the State, which can lead to a certain degree of relaxation from the part of SOE managers for 
achieving better results, may partly explain such differences (Picot & Kaulmann, 1989; González-








     Dependent Variables 




PUB - 0.035*** -0.026*** 
  (0.004) (0.000) 
Liquidity   0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage   0.246***  - 0.080*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Tangibility - 0.081*** - 0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size - 0.085***   - 0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
LnBoard - 0.014***     0.003*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
LnNetIncome   0.079***  
  (0.000)  
Dummy Country Included Included 
Dummy Sector Included Included 
Dummy Year Included Included 
Observations 55,965 72,974 
R2  0.2821  0.1479 
PUB: dummy variable with value 1 for SOE and 0 for NSOE; Liquity: Current Assets 
/Current Liabilities; Leverage: Total Liabilities/Total Assets; Tangibility: Fixed Tangible 
Assets/Total Assets; Size: Ln (Total Assets); LnBoard: Ln (No. Board Members); 
LnNetIncome: Ln (Net Income). The value in brackets is the t-statistic corrected for 
clusters by enterprise; ***, **, *, statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Table 3 – Profitability of SOE vs. NSOE 
 




With regards to the control variables, the results suggest that enterprises with less liquidity, a 
greater proportion of fixed tangible assets, and greater size have higher levels of return on assets 
and equity. 
Concerning the impact of leverage and the size of the Board, the results are mixed. While for ROE, 
the results suggest a favourable impact of leverage: if the debt ratio increases one value, ROE will 
on average increase 24.6%, whereas  for ROA, the results suggest a negative impact: if the debt 
ratio increases one value, ROA will on average decline 8%. As for the size of the Board, the results 
suggest that the greater the number of members, the higher the ROA and the lower the ROE. 
It should be noted that all coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, and that the obtained values 
of R2 are consistent with previous studies. In fact, Bozec et al., (2002) present R2 values of 0.33 and 
0.195 for ROE and for ROA, respectively, and Boardman & Vinning (1989) obtain 0.178 and 0.191 
for ROE and ROA, respectively. 
In short, the results for both performance measures confirm hypothesis H1. Therefore, there is 
evidence that the SOE in the sample are, on average, less profitable than NSOE; in other words, 
NSOE make better use of shareholders’ capital and manage their assets more efficiently than SOE. 
However, it is important to remember that social and labour gains may be associated with the 
lower profitability of SOE (Reeves & Ryan, 1998). 
Profitability of SOE vs. NSOE: The Impact of the Financial Crisis 
As the sample period includes years of financial crisis, two additional analyses were carried out in 
order to assess the impact of the crisis on the profitability of SOE and NSOE.  
Thus, different dummy variables were included in Models (1) and (2), resulting from the interaction 
between the CRISIS variable and PUB variable: DPC - NSOE in the period of crisis; DPNC - NSOE 
not in the period of crisis; DPUBC - SOE in the period of crisis and DPUBNC - SOE not in the 
period of crisis. The variable CRISIS takes the value 1 for years considered of crisis (2007 to 2011), 
and 0 if otherwise.  
Table 4 presents the main results of the regressions. Panel A shows the results of the comparative 
analysis of profitability between SOE and NSOE during the financial crisis period, and Panel B shows 
results that allow the assessment of the impact of the financial crisis on profitability.  
The table shows that, during the financial crisis, SOE continue to show profitability levels lower 
than NSOE, and that the coefficients of the DPUBC variable (Panel A) are negative and statistically 



































Table 4 – Profitability of SOE vs. NSOE: Financial Crisis 
 
                                                    Dependent Variables 
 ROE ROA 
Independent Variables   
DPUBC      - 0.032***  - 0.025*** 
    (0.000)            (0.000)            
   DPUBNC      - 0.027***        - 0.027*** 
   (0.000)            (0.000) 
                DPNC        0.007***  0.001** 
   (0.007)            (0.023) 
Remaining variables 
(except PUB) 
 Included          Included 
Observations 55,965 72,974 
R2 0.2354 0.1479 
 
Panel B: SOE in the period of crisis and non-crisis  
                                                     Dependent Variables 
 ROE ROA 
Independent Variables   
DPC       0.021***      0.027*** 
  (0.000)             (0.000)            
  DPNC      0.035***      0.028*** 
  (0.000)     (0.000) 
    DPUBC  - 0.012**   0.001 
  (0.011)      (0.183) 
Remaining variables 
(except PUB) 
Included     Included 
Observations 55,965    72,974 
R2 0.2352    0.1434 
DPC: dummy variable with value 1 for a NSOE in the period of crisis and 0 if otherwise; DPNC:  dummy 
variable with value 1 for a NSOE not in the period of crisis and 0 if otherwise; DPUBC:  dummy variable 
with value 1 for a SOE in the period of crisis and 0 if otherwise; DPUBNC:  dummy variable with value 
1 for a SOE not in the period of crisis and 0 if otherwise.  The value in brackets is the t-statistic corrected 
for clusters by enterprise; ***, **, *, statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 




The results shown in Panel B suggest that the crisis negatively affected the return on equity of SOE, 
as the ROE is on average lower by 1.2% during the period of crisis, and it had no impact on the 
return on assets, as the ROA coefficient is not statistically significant. The same is observed for 
NSOE, as there was a decrease in profitability during the period of crisis. NSOE, during the period 
of crisis, had a ROE lower by 0.7% when compared to the period of no financial crisis.  
In short, the results of analyses carried out on the possible impact of the crisis on corporate 
profitability confirm the results of the main analysis - SOE are less profitable than NSOE, and 
suggest that the financial crisis had a negative impact on the return on equity of both SOE and 
NSOE.  
Profitability of SOE vs. NSOE: Western Europe vs. Eastern Europe 
Given the significant role that SOE played and continues to play in the economy of Eastern 
European countries, it will be interesting to observe whether these enterprises are more, or less 
profitable than their non-state-owned counterparts, as well as to compare their performance levels 
with those of SOE in Western European countries. 
In order to carry out these additional analyses, countries were classified as Western or Eastern 
European, according to the criterion of UNESCO (see Appendix 4). Then, different dummy 
variables were created and included in the regressions (1) and (2) resulting from the interaction 
between the Western European variable and the PUB variable: DPWE -   Western European 
NSOE; DPEE - Eastern European NSOE;  DPUBWE -  Western European SOE and DPUBEE -  
Eastern European SOE.  
Table 5 presents the main results. Panel A shows the results of the comparative analysis of 
profitability between SOE and NSOE in countries of Western and Eastern Europe, and Panel B 
shows the results of the comparative analysis of profitability of SOE in Western Europe vs. Eastern 
Europe.  
Regarding SOE vs. NSOE, it can be concluded that, both in Western and Eastern Europe, SOE are 
always less profitable than NSOE, which once again confirms the previous conclusion that SOE are 
less profitable than NSOE.  
With respect to SOE only, in terms of ROA, Western European SOE are more profitable than 
their Eastern European counterparts. On average, Western European SOE have a ROA that is 










Panel A: SOE vs. NSOE in Western Europe 
 
Panel B: SOE in Western Europe and Eastern Europe 
 
Table 5 – Profitability of SOE Western Europe vs. Eastern Europe 
                                                  Dependent Variables 
 ROE ROA 
Independent Variables   
                 DPUBEE    -0.022***       -0.029***    
 (0.001)    (0.000)    
DPUBWE    -0.028***       -0.017***    
 (0.000)    (0.000) 
                 DPEE      0.043***         0.013***    
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Remaining variables (except PUB) Included Included 
Observations 55965 72794 
R2 0.2832 0.1480 
                                                  Dependent Variables 
 ROE ROA 
Independent Variables   
DPWE    0.022***       0.029***    
 (0.001)    (0.000)    
DPEE    0.066***       0.042***    
 (0.000)    (0.000) 
               DPUBWE - 0,005         0,011***    
 (0.419) (0,000) 
Remaining variables (except PUB) Included Included 
Observations               55,965             72,794 
R2                 0.2832   0.1480 
DPWE: dummy variable with value 1 if it is a NSOE of a country in Western Europe and 0 if otherwise; 
DPEE:  dummy variable with value 1 if it is a NSOE of a country in Eastern Europe and 0 if otherwise; 
DPUBWE:  dummy variable with value 1 if it is a SOE of a country in Western Europe and 0 if otherwise 
and; DPUBEE:  dummy variable with value 1 if it is a SOE of a country in Eastern Europe and 0 if 
otherwise.  The value in brackets is the t-statistic corrected for clusters by enterprise; ***, **, *, statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 




Regarding ROE, there is no statistical evidence that Western European SOE are more profitable. 
However, taking only into account NSOE, the inverse relationship is observed. Panel A shows that 
Eastern Europe NSOE have higher levels of profitability (ROE and ROA) than Western European 
NSOE (0.043 and 0.013 respectively).   
These results can be partly explained by the fact that Eastern European countries have been 
experiencing higher growth rates in GDP, despite the fact that, as a rule, Western European 
countries are richer. On the other hand, it must be highlighted that the countries of Eastern Europe 
still have, in relative terms, a very high number of SOE, as can be seen in Appendix 1, which 
increases the probability of the existence of less-profitable enterprises in the public sector.  
Impact of the Percentage of State Control on the Profitability of SOE 
Only a few studies analyse the profitability of SOE based on the percentage of State control. 
Therefore, it would be interesting to analyse the impact that a higher or lower participation of the 
State in the capital of enterprises has on the profitability of SOE. Thus, the PUB dummy variable 
was replaced by the CONTROL continuous variable, which represents the percentage of capital 








Table 6 – Impact of the Percentage of State Control 
The coefficients of the CONTROL variable are both negative and statistically significant, suggesting 
that the greater the State control, the lower the levels of returns on equity and assets.  
These results reinforce the previous findings. It can be concluded that SOE are less profitable than 
NSOE, and that the higher the percentage of capital held by the State, the lower the level of 
profitability of SOE.       
        Dependent Variables 
 ROE ROA 
Independent Variables   
               CONTROL        - 0.00026***        - 0.000301*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Remaining variables (except 
PUB)  
Included Included 
Observations 54,935 71,717 
R2    0.2815    0.1488 
CONTROL: percentage of capital held by the Sate in each SOE; The value in brackets is the t-
statistic corrected for clusters by enterprise; ***, **, *, statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 





A comparative analyses of the profitability of SOE and NSOE for a period of nine years (2003-
2011) was carried out, based on a sample of 10,994 enterprises from 37 European countries. On 
average, SOE in the sample are larger, and employ more people than NSOE.  
The main results suggest that European SOE are less profitable than NSOE, both at the level of 
return on equity and return on assets. On average, the ROE of a SOE is lower by 3.5%, and the 
ROA is lower by 2.6% when compared to those of a NSOE.  
The lack of competition, the lack of objectives for maximization of profit, the lack of pressure and 
incentives of SOE managers to improve corporate performance may all contribute to a less-efficient 
management of assets and to a lower performance of SOE when compared with their non-state-
owned counterparts. However, it is important to remember that the lower profitability of SOE 
may be associated with social gains (Reeves & Ryan, 1998). 
The results also suggest that enterprises with less liquidity, greater proportion of fixed tangible 
assets, and larger size have higher levels of ROE and ROA, and that leverage has a strong impact 
on ROE. In fact, an increase of one unit in the debt ratio increases the ROE by around 25%.  
The results from the additional analyses carried out confirm our main conclusion - SOE are less 
profitable than NSOE, which have higher performance levels in Western and Eastern European 
countries during periods of financial crisis (2007-2011) and also periods of non-crisis (2003-2006).  
The results also suggest that Western European SOE manage their assets more efficiently than 
their counterparts in Eastern Europe, with higher levels of ROA. The same is not observed in NSOE.  
It was also observed that during the period of financial crisis, enterprises had lower levels of ROE, 
which shows a negative effect of the financial crisis on the profitability of SOE and NSOE.  
Finally, the findings show that the difference in the profitability levels of SOE and NSOE is even 
more noticeable when there is a higher percentage of capital owned by the State, supporting the 
idea that an increase of Sate control over the enterprises does not generate greater efficiency in 
the management of resources, neither a greater return for equity investors.  
With regards to the main limitation of this study, we highlight the lack of information that made it 
impossible to deepen the analyses carried out. Specifically, it was not possible to classify SOE 
according to those that maximize profit, and those that do not maximize profit, as suggested by 
Bozec et al. (2002); nor to include in the study other explanatory factors for the profitability 
differences between SOE and NSOE identified in the literature, such as level of competition. 
In the future, it would be interesting to extend the study to other countries outside Europe, namely 
China. It would also be interesting to compare the profitability levels of listed and unlisted SOE, in 
order to analyse the impact of the capital market on the profitability of SOE.  
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Country No. SOE No. NSOE Total % SOE 
Germany 335  1,773 2,108 15.9% 
Austria  25  130 155 16.1% 
Bosnia Herzegovina 12  6 18 66.7% 
Belgium 11  87 98 11.2% 
Bulgaria         106  7 113 93.8% 
Belarus 278  1 279 99.6% 
Croatia 27  16 43 62.8% 
Cyprus 1  3 4 25% 
Denmark 3  185 188 1.6% 
Slovenia 1  1 2 50% 
Slovakia 10  8 18 55.6% 
Estonia 2  5 7 28.7% 
Spain 73  516 589 12.4% 
Finland 25  67 92 27.2 
France 39  1,012 1,051 3.7% 
Great-Britain 14  1,794 1,808 0.8% 
Greece 3  63 66 4.5% 
Hungary 0 9 9 0% 
Ireland 2  35 37 5.4% 
Italy 122  988 1,110 11% 
Latvia 2  3 5 40% 
Lithuania 7  12 19 36.8% 
Luxembourg 1  9 10 10% 
Moldavia 6  0 6 100% 
Montenegro 6  1 7 85.7% 
Holland 8  128 136 5.9% 
Norway 4  92 96 4.1% 
Poland 248  43 291 85.2% 
Portugal 17  94 111 14.3% 
Czech Republic 7  42 49 14.3% 
Romania 27 36 63 42.9% 
Russia 891 376 1,267 70.3% 
Serbia 1 22 23 4.4% 
Sweden 30 233 263 11.4% 
Switzerland 38  42 80 47.5% 
Turkey 2  16 18 11.1% 
Ukraine 658 47 705 93.3% 
Total 3,042 7,902 10,944  27.8% 
Appendix 1 – Structure of the sample by country 




Sector No. of 
Enterprises 
Sector 11 (Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting)    201 
Sector 21 (Mining, Quarrying, and Oil and Gas Extraction)    151 
Sector 22 (Utilities)    570 
Sector 23 (Construction)    636 
Sector 31 to 33 (Manufacturing) 3,024 
Sector 42 (Wholesale Trade)    466 
Sector 44 & 45 (Retail Trade)    507 
Sector 48 & 49 (Transportation and Warehousing)    853 
Sector 51 (Information)    284 
Sector 52 (Finance and Insurance)    192 
Sector 53 (Real Estate and Rental and Leasing)    340 
Sector 54 (Professional, Scientific and Technical Services)    833 
Sector 55 (Management of Companies and Enterprises) 1,494 
Sector 56 (Administrative and Support and Waste Management and Remediation Services)    589 
Sector 61 (Educational Services)     45 
Sector 62 (Health Care and Social Assistance)   424 
Sector 71 (Arts, Entertainment and Recreation)     95 
Sector 72 (Accommodation and Food Services)     63 
Sector 81 (Other Services)    130 
Sector 92 (Public Administration)     47 
Total    10,944 
    















Appendix 3 – Description of variables 
 
Variable Description Formula 
ROE Return on Equity Net Income / Total Equity 
ROA Return on Assets Net Income / Total Assets 
PUB  SOE Dummy variable, value 1 if the “ultimate 
owner” is the State of a country in 
Europe or value 0 if otherwise 
Leverage Level of Indebtedness Total Liabilities / Total Assets 
Liquidity Level of Liquidity Total Current Assets / Total Current 
Liabilities 
Tangibility Level of Tangibility Total Fixed Tangible Assets / Total 
Assets 
Size Dimension Logarithm of Total Assets 
LnBoard Dimension of the Board Logarithm of number of Board 
Members in 2011 
LnNetIncome Net Income Logarithm of net income 
Sector Industry Sector  Dummy variable, starting on the 
agriculture sector 
Country Country Value of annual GDP growth of each 
country rather than the value 1 
characteristic of dummy variables 
(Dewenter & Malatesta, 2001) 
Year Year Dummy variable, starting on the oldest 
year (2003) 
